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LIBERTY BOUND: OBERGEFELL’S ECLIPSE 
OF POWER TO LIMIT SEXUAL AUTONOMY 
Kimberly West-Faulcon∗ 
          “[W]hat the Court really has refused to recognize is the 
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of 
their intimate associations with others.”1 
 
On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its historic 
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 holding that states cannot prohibit 
same-sex couples from marrying.3 The decision’s practical 
significance in the lives of Americans is immense4 and it has already 
been hailed as ushering in a new birth of freedom in the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence.5 I choose to make a far less 
 
 ∗ James P. Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles; B.A., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School. I wish to thank Neil 
Richmond for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). see also id. at 2598 (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court 
has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”); id. at 2602 
(“The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition . . .); see also id. (“The 
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is derived too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of laws.”). 
 3. Id. at 2607−08 (also holding that states must recognize same-sex marriages licensed and 
performed in other states). 
 4. See, e.g., Angela K. Perone, Health Implications of the Supreme Court’s Obergefell vs. 
Hodges Marriage Equality Decision, 2 LGBT Health 196 (2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC4713052 (considering negative health effects of marriage bans and potential 
health insurance and tax issues stemming from the Obergefell decision); Brittany Blackburn 
Koch, The Effect of Obergefell v. Hodges for Same-Sex Couples, Nat’l L. Rev. (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/effect-obergefell-v-hodges-same-sex-couples (addressing 
legal provisions and protections that will apply to same-sex couples after Obergefell, including 
joint tax filing, intestacy laws, and estate planning benefits); Emma Green, How Will the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Same-Sex-Marriage Decision Affect Religious Liberty?, Atlantic (June 26, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/how-will-the-us-supreme-courts-
same-sex-marriage-decision-affect-religious-liberty/396986 (discussing the uncertainty in “what 
will happen to the many, many religious organizations that don’t support homosexuality, let alone 
gay marriage.”). 
 5. See e.g., Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 Harv. L. 
Rev. 147, 148 (2015) (describing Obergefell as “a game changer for substantive due process 
jurisprudence”). 
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sanguine observation. While Obergefell strongly and unequivocally 
protects same-sex marriage rights, it recognizes the right to 
autonomy in sexual intimacy as fundamental but without 
elaboration.6 With a potential change in the ideological composition 
of the Supreme Court on the horizon, it is important to be clear that 
Justice Kennedy’s statement in Lawrence v. Texas7 adopting the 
analysis of Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v. 
Hardwick8 combined with Kennedy’s reference in Obergefell to 
sexual intimacy as a fundamental liberty protect the fundamental 
right of adult sexual autonomy from erosion. 
I. 
Justice Scalia’s observation that Kennedy seems to employ a 
form of rational basis review in Lawrence, not strict scrutiny, to 
protect the right to sexual activity has some salience.9 However, 
Kennedy’s Obergefell decision refers to sexual intimacy as a 
“fundamental right.”10 Close to thirty years after Bowers applied 
rational basis review to Georgia’s law criminalizing anal and oral 
sex11 and twelve years after Scalia contended that Lawrence’s 
application of rational basis review12 left the central legal conclusion 
 
 6.  135 S. Ct. at 2606 (referencing a “intimacy” and “marriage” as “other fundamental 
rights” for which it would inconsistent with the approach the Court has used to define the liberty 
interest “in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices”).  
 7.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8.  After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against him, Michael Hardwick encouraged 
Americans to see the Court’s now overruled 5-4 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick Bowers as 
narrowly construing the sexual autonomy rights of all persons, LGBT or not. However, the 
Bowers majority opinion successfully diverted attention from how the ruling potentially 
proscribed the sexual autonomy rights of heterosexuals. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 (1986) 
(accepting the district court’s determination that the heterosexual couple John and Mary Doe’s 
challenge to the Georgia statute “did not have proper standing to maintain the action” and 
observing “[w]e express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statue as applied to 
other acts of sodomy”). The Court’s myopic description of the issue in Bowers as the 
constitutionality of a Georgia anti-sodomy statute only “as applied to consensual homosexual 
sodomy” ignored the law’s explicit restriction on both heterosexual and homosexual anal and oral 
sex. Id. 
 9.    Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Lawrence majority 
opinion as failing to apply strict scrutiny by stating “nor does it subject the Texas law to the 
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 
‘fundamental right’”). 
 10.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (explicitly employing the term “fundamental 
right” in the phrase “it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other 
fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy”). 
 11.   Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding Georgia anti-sodomy statute satisfied the rational 
basis standard of review). 
 12.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Donald H.J. Hermann, 
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of Bowers “strangely untouched,”13 this should relegate to a debate 
of only academic consequence the argument that Lawrence v. Texas 
fails to protect sexual autonomy as a fundamental right.14 
While Obergefell facilitates revisiting the issue of what standard 
of review applies to laws infringing on the fundamental right to 
sexual autonomy, the doctrinal clarity the case provides with respect 
to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage potentially introduces a 
doctrinal paradox: that laws that infringe the fundamental right of 
same-sex couples to marry would trigger strict scrutiny analysis but 
laws that infringe on the fundamental right of consenting adults to 
make decisions with regards to sexual intimacy might not warrant 
that same high level of judicial scrutiny. Does infringement of the 
fundamental right to sexual autonomy merely trigger Justice 
Kennedy’s idiosyncratic “animus test”15 or are laws criminalizing 
adult consensual sexual decisions subject to the more robust and 
more predictably rights-protective strict scrutiny standard? 
II. 
 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared strict scrutiny to 
be the proper standard for protecting the freedom to sexual autonomy 
infringed by the Georgia law under review in Bowers,16 doing so 
long before Justice Kennedy’s first explicit reference to sexual 
 
Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the Constitution, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 909, 
941 (2005) (“Thus, the majority found no need to determine whether sexual intimacy, including 
sexual activity between unmarried persons or persons of the same sex, involved a fundamental 
right since the statute did not survive rational basis review, obviating the need to apply a strict 
scrutiny analysis.”). 
 13.   Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14.  Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court majority in Lawrence as “not 
hav[ing] the boldness to reverse” “Bowers’ conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a 
‘fundamental right’” and noting that Kennedy only used the terms “fundamental propositions” 
and “fundamental decisions,” not the term fundamental right). 
 15.  See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 151, 169−70 
(describing Justice Kennedy’s use of rational basis to strike down laws in Romer v. Evans and 
Lawrence v. Texas as applying an “animus test”). 
 16.  The Eleventh Circuit used the following language: 
The Georgia sodomy statue implicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick. The 
activity he hopes to engage in is quintessentially private and lies at the heart of an 
intimate association beyond the proper reach of state regulation. . . . We therefore 
remand this case for trial, at which time the State must prove in order to prevail that it 
has a compelling interest in regulating this behavior and that this statute is the most 
narrowly drawn means of safeguarding that interest. 
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212−13 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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autonomy as a fundamental right. Now that Kennedy has definitively 
recognized the fundamental nature of sexual autonomy in Obergefell, 
Scalia’s view that Kennedy’s Lawrence analysis sets rational basis as 
the standard for reviewing laws that criminalize adult sexual 
intimacies is untenable. 
In his 2003 Lawrence opinion, Kennedy is definitive in his 
rejection of the Bowers holding and reasoning when he declares 
Bowers incorrect in framing the legal question as whether the 
constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy.”17 However, instead of making it clear that a law 
banning anal and oral sex is subject to strict scrutiny analysis 
because it infringes on a fundamental right, Kennedy’s ultimate 
analysis uses the terminology long-associated with the rational basis 
standard of review—whether the law serves a “legitimate” 
government purpose.18 Because of this—Justice Kennedy seemingly 
using rational basis instead of strict scrutiny as the standard the 
Texas law had to meet, Justice Scalia characterized Lawrence as 
aligned with Bowers in deeming rational basis to be the proper test 
for justifying a state law infringing sexual autonomy.19 
While rhetorically clever, there are two reasons—one that 
predates Obergefell and another made possible by it—that undermine 
the validity of future invocations of Scalia’s reasoning to argue 
government efforts to regulate sexual intimacy among consenting 
adults need only satisfy rational basis review. First, in language 
Justice Scalia’s dissent ignores, Lawrence explicitly incorporates, 
albeit without quotation, the analysis in Justice Stevens’ Bowers 
dissent as controlling and integral to the Lawrence holding. Second, 
now that Obergefell has clearly embraced sexual autonomy as a 
fundamental right on par with marriage autonomy, Scalia’s argument 
that Kennedy’s use of the term “legitimate” instead of the word 
 
 17. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 566–67 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (West 
2003)). Justice Kennedy also engaged in a detailed historical analysis of anti-sodomy laws that 
led his to the conclusion that the question of whether there is a history and tradition of prohibiting 
private homosexual sex between consenting adults was “more complex than the majority opinion 
and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate[d].” Id. at 571. 
 18. Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”) (emphasis added). 
 19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the “actual holding” in 
Lawrence is that the Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy “furthers no legitimate state 
interest” and thereby only applies “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review” not a heightened 
judicial scrutiny).  
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“compelling”—the standard applicable under strict scrutiny—has 
even less persuasive value than it may have had prior to Obergefell. 
Lawrence explicitly incorporates Justice Stevens’ definitive 
treatment of sexual autonomy as a fundamental right. While Justice 
Scalia is correct that the text of Lawrence does not use the term 
“fundamental right” nor the term “fundamental liberty interest,”20 the 
dissent by Justice Stevens in Bowers that Kennedy declares to be part 
and parcel of his Lawrence opinion does assert clearly that the Due 
Process Clause protects “the right to engage in nonreproductive 
sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.”21 
Even if it were plausible pre-Obergefell, the Lawrence majority 
opinion’s inclusion of Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent means 
Lawrence can no longer be fairly read as condoning judicial 
treatment of the right to sexual autonomy as a second-class liberty. 
When Lawrence and Obergefell are read together, there is no 
plausible interpretation other than that the right to engage in 
nonreproductive sexual conduct that others may find offensive (how 
Stevens described the right he clearly deemed constitutionally 
protected) is enjoyed by all persons, irrespective of sexual 
orientation. 
CONCLUSION 
Three decades after Bowers v. Hardwick, the landmark 
Obergefell v. Hodges decision protecting same-sex marriage rights 
lifts the cloud on whether the Court’s protection of sexual autonomy 
rights as fundamental requires the application of strict scrutiny. Even 
after Obergefell’s textual reference to sexual intimacy as a 
fundamental right, I expect that some jurists will seek to argue state 
regulation of sexual behavior between consenting adults in private is 
only subject to, at most, the toughened version of rational basis 
review applied in Lawrence. However, as much as Obergefell’s 
vigorous protection of the right to marry for same-sex couples is 
 
 20.  Id. 593 (“Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a 
“fundamental liberty interest,’ nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny.”). 
 21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In all events, it is perfectly clear that 
the State of Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct proscribed by § 16-6-2 of the Georgia 
Criminal Code.”). Cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(stating in characterizing the majority opinion that “what the Court really has refused to recognize 
is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate 
associations with others”). 
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front and center in the opinion, the case also makes it more difficult 
to contend adult sexual intimacy rights fail to warrant the heightened 
standard of strict scrutiny as protection. Obergefell’s role in 
providing greater clarity as to the limits on the government’s power 
to regulate sexual intimacy behind closed bedroom doors means the 
decision is of broader personal significance to Americans of all 
sexual orientations than many would realize22—a point Michael 
Hardwick would likely have sought to emphasize.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Kindly be informed that this is the last page of the Forward. The next 
Article begins on page 375.  
 
 22. Research shows fewer and fewer persons of any sexual orientation are financial able or 
are opting to marry. Cf. Melissa Murray, Recovering the Right to Not Marry, Calif. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652478; Douglas 
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its 
Relationship to Marriage, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 87 (2014) (noting that fewer Americans have the 
inclination and financial resources to enter into marriage). 
 23. Cf. In criticizing the Court’s decision in Bowers, Hardwick called for the “gay 
community to pull together, and also for the heterosexual community to pull together, against 
something that’s affecting both of us.” PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: 
SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 403 (1988). 
 
